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A HIDDEN HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE

OBLIGATION
Patrick 0. Gudridge

I.

INTRODUCTION

This contribution to the Symposium was supposed to be titled "The Age of
Aquarius?"' In 1977 Laurence Tribe and Frank Michelman published articles arguing to
the same conclusion: Initial impressions notwithstanding, the United States Supreme
Court decision in National League of Cities v. Usery2 is best understood as recognizing
and protecting-however implicitly or obliquely-constitutional obligations requiring
states to assure their residents certain minimum services. 3 Prominent initial reactions to
these articles were not entirely positive-putting it mildly. 4 It seemed bizarre then-it
may still seem bizarre now-to suggest that the National League of Cities majority
opinion, the work of Justice William Rehnquist, pointed toward a jurisprudence of
affirmative obligation, however much Tribe and Michelman wished for that
jurisprudence to prevail. "Mystic crystal revelation, and the mind's true liberation" 5-it
was (it might have been said) all too 1960s, already out of date.
The reactions of the critics, though, seemed to me to suggest another reading.
National League of Cities was (at the time) the last in a blizzard of opinions Justice
Rehnquist had generated, especially since 1974--opinions (it is easier to see now) that
challenged and reordered then-standard assumptions, both formal and substantive, about
the content of constitutional law, the organizing structure of federal law generally, and
reader expectations regarding judicial opinion-writing. Rehnquist-that Rehnquist,
anyway-somehow seized the devices of critical legal studies in utero. 6 It would not be
surprising if Tribe and Michelman meant to write against Justice Rehnquist. Explaining
the interestingly different approaches the two took was supposed to be the ultimate aim
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1. The 5th Dimension, The Age ofAquarius (Buddha Records 1969) (CD).
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garciav. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
3. Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles. Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L.J. 1165, 1174 (1977); Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of
Cities: The New Federalismand Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1065,
1076 (1977).
4. See infra nn. 13-24 and accompanying text.
5. The 5th Dimension, supra n. 1, at Aquarius/Let the Sun Shine In.
6. Interestingly, most of the essays and memorials published on the occasion of William Rehnquist's death
did not make much of his work in this period, choosing to emphasize, for both criticism and praise, his later,
seemingly "moderate" work as Chief Justice.
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of this exercise.
The present intrudes, however: The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in
Massachusetts v. Environmental ProtectionAgency, 7 I realized, returns us-almost--to
the 1977 universe of Rehnquist, Tribe, and Michelman. The majority opinion that
Justice Stevens wrote in the Massachusetts case includes a considerable discussion of
why Massachusetts had standing to challenge the failure of the EPA to regulate
greenhouse gases-in particular, the concerns state officials took to be pertinent. 8 But
for present purposes, what matters most is the emphasis that Stevens gave to a centuryold opinion written by Justice Holmes-Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.9 Chief
Justice Roberts, dissenting, dismissed Tennessee Copper as essentially an irrelevant
curiosity. 1° It turns out, though, that the Holmes opinion is one of a line of casesmoving forward through the twentieth century, and backwards past the Civil War. This
line includes-not marginally-In re Debs,1 1 a large decision indeed. Across the range
of cases, we glimpse what turns out to be a constitutional account of the origins of
affirmative obligation. We may well wonder whether the National League of Cities
articles that Professor Tribe and Michelman wrote caught something important after all.
12
The effort here acquires, almost by accident, a considerably larger ambition.

II.

THE CRITICAL REACTION

The Tribe and Michelman efforts, themselves, do not become a focus of this
discussion until it has proceeded fairly far. Two backdrops need to be set up. The first is
a brief exploration of the reactions of the critics.
It was not as though the National League of Cities articles went unread. Mark
Tushnet thought that the Supreme Court's own effort was "fundamentally incoherent,"
but he also concluded that Professor Tribe's reading was "a less coherent rendering"' 13 of
what Tushnet thought that the Court meant to accomplish itself-to protect "the ability
14
of states to stand as guardians against overreaching by the national government."
Then-professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg, reviewing the first edition of American
ConstitutionalLaw, 15 judged the National League of Cities gloss, as Tribe restated it
there, to be "extravagant ....
Occam's razor is not prominent in the analysis." 16 The
late David Currie described the Michelman and Tribe gloss as "fanciful to the extent it is
not facetious; it transforms a decision designed as a shield for state autonomy into a

7. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
8. See id. at 1452-58.
9. 206 U.S. 230 (1907); see Mass., 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55.
10. See id. at 1465 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
11. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
12. I do not mean to claim that Justice Rehnquist, were he aware of the Tennessee Copper line, would have
understood these decisions as underpinning his own analysis. The twenty-first century, so far at least, is not the
Age of Aquarius.
13. Mark Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies and ConstitutionalLaw: An Essay in Deconstruction,36 Stan. L.
Rev. 623, 636 n. 50 (1984).
14. Id. at 636.
15. Laurence Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw (Foundation Press 1978).
16. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Book Review, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 340, 344 (1978). She liked the book as a whole:
"A work of spectacular originality, sometimes elusive and uniformly provocative." Id. at 340.
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sword for its destruction." 17 Writing more recently, Richard Epstein agreed, adding a
pejorative "legal alchemy."18
In his widely-noticed The Case Against Brilliance,19 Daniel Farber used the Tribe
and Michelman articles as a central illustration of what follows-and what "should be
abandoned"--given "the current academic bias in favor of brilliant, 'paradigm shifting'
work.",2 0 Farber's provocative comments warrant careful reading:
The most famous example is the attempt ...by two brilliant professors, to show that
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in National League of Cities... really established a
constitutional right to welfare....
Of course, this interpretation was so dazzlingly brilliant just because it was painfully
obvious that Justice Rehnquist had no such thing in mind.... [T]here is something
inherently suspect about an interpretation so clever that it never would have occurred to the
speaker or the audience. If Paul Pedestrian asks someone to pass the salt, one might argue
that he "really" must mean, "pass a healthful and taste-enhancing condiment"-a
description that does not apply to salt, if current medical theories are correct. So, in some
sense, what Paul "really" means is "pass the pepper." In the same sense, what Justice
Rehnquist "really" meant was to establish a constitutional right to welfare-which is, as
the professors explained, what he would have meant if he had2 been
as clever as they were.
1
But he wasn't that clever, so it wasn't what he meant after all.
Professor Farber revisited his essay a year later, this time exploring at further
length possible interpretations of the Tribe/Michelman thesis. 22 He concluded: "The
flaw.., is not just that it won't persuade Rehnquist, but that it shouldn't.... Even the
best logical argument will not persuade him that the 'sun rises in the west,' because his
belief to the contrary is strongly rooted in his experience." 2 3 Farber proceeded, drawing
on Kuhn, Quine, and company, to make what he called "The Case for Common
24
Sense."
Was William Rehnquist "Paul Pedestrian"? 2 5 "[J]udges are not as clever as the
scholars," Professor Farber wrote, noting as well: "With unusual candor, a Minnesota
trial judge recently acknowledged that '[I]f IQ tests were used in grading judges, I
wouldn't be a judge." '26 Was Justice Rehnquist just some sort of judicial
peasant,
27
guided by "his experience" not to believe that "the sun rises in the west?"
Justice Rehnquist? Daniel Farber could not have meant to make these equations.

17. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 864, 878 n. 79 (1986).
18. Richard A. Epstein, The Federalism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor: Is Half a Loaf
Enough? 58 Stan L. Rev. 1793, 1806 n. 56 (2006). Professor Epstein also criticized Justice Rehnquist's
opinion. Id. at 1805-07.
19. Daniel A. Farber, The Case againstBrilliance,70 Minn. L. Rev. 917 (1986).
20. Id. (quoting Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 10 (2d ed., U. Chicago Press 1970).
21. Id. at 926-27.
22. See Daniel A. Farber, BrillianceRevisited, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 367, 369-75 (1987). He writes in response
to Pierre Schlag, The Brilliant,the Curious,and the Wrong, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 917 (1987).
23. Farber, supran. 22, at 374.
24. Id.at375;seeid.at 375-81.
25. Farber, supran. 19, at 927.
26. Id.at 929; id. at 929 n. 51 (quoting Jim Klobuchar, 4 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 1B (Oct. 10, 1985)).
27. Farber, supran. 22, at 374.
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28
He had to have known that they were and are-to put it mildly-wildly wrong.
Perhaps Farber would have been prepared, in some other setting, to criticize Rehnquist or
other judicial "brilliants" on similar terms. 29 For the moment, he wanted to focus on
academic manifestations. Or perhaps Professor Farber understood that if Justice
Rehnquist's work-including National League of Cities-were acknowledged to be
original, challenging, and plainly threatening to at least some conceptions of the
substance of constitutional law, Professors Tribe and Michelman might be plausibly
understood as attempting to meet the challenge and blunt the threat. If so, their own
originalities might appear to be less off-putting,
recognizably responses (whether or not
' 3 ° nor "clever." 3 1
successful), neither "facetious

III.

WHAT JUSTICE REHNQUIST DID

In the two years or so preceding National League of Cities, Justice Rehnquist
wrote a sequence of opinions that, as they accumulated, revealed a distinctive, dramatic
(for many, disturbing) approach to constitutional adjudication.
A.

Descriptionof NonconstitutionalLaw Displaces ConstitutionalAnalysis Per Se

Arnett v. Kennedy-Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in that case-was and
remains the epitome. 3 2 The opinion has become a casebook staple, we all know, this
sentence always quoted: "[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in
determining that right, a litigant ... must take the bitter with the sweet." 33 The sentence
states a conclusion, it might appear, about the content of constitutional law-about
whether the usual requirements of procedural due process hold if legislation-defining
entitlements, invoked in individual instances, also specify the hearing procedures to be
followed. It is possible to think-indeed, the Supreme Court would within a few years
commit itself to thinking 34-that the question is one which is chiefly resolved through

28. Professor Farber himself has written brilliantly. (I mean this in the old-fashioned sense, as a genuine
compliment.) In his book Lincoln 's Constitution, Farber explores constitutional issues that arose in the course
of the Civil War from within a perspective that appears to treat as contemporaries not only Lincoln, his
colleagues, and his immediate predecessors and successors, but also the so-called Framers (Washington,
Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, etc.), and present day Justices, judicial opinions, and constitutional doctrine. As
a result, the reader is put in a distinctive, initially disconcerting original position, not only able to judge Lincoln
as we would judge him by our lights, but to use Lincoln and his arguments as a baseline for assessing the acts
and arguments of our own contemporaries. If we sympathize with Lincoln, Farber's reader inevitably wonders,
why not similarly sympathize with... ? See generally Daniel Farber, Lincoln 's Constitution(U Chicago Press
2003).
29. For well-known, formidable criticism of Justice Rehnquist around the time of National League of
Cities, see David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 293 (1976). Paul
Carrington has sharply criticized brilliant-in his terms "heroic"--judging See Paul D. Carrington, Stewards
of Democracy: Law as a Public Profession (Westview Press 1999). For discussion of the difficulty of
Professor Camngton's use of Thomas Cooley as the paradigmatic anti-hero, see Patrick 0. Gudridge,
Carrington,Cooley, Kennedy, Klare, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 837, 837-48 (2001).
30. Currie, supra n. 17, at 878 n. 79.
31. Farber, supra n. 19, at 929.
32. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
33. Id. at 153-54.
34. ClevelandBd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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reference to constitutional concerns as such. But Rehnquist's particular approach, it is
clear, treats the question as not itself a question of due process of law, as instead
extrinsic, an at the threshold regulation of the relevance of due process, to be explored
35
and resolved entirely through properly conscientious reading of legislative enactments.
Only by bifurcating the very sentence of the Act of Congress which conferred upon
appellee the right not to be removed save for cause could it be said that he had an
expectancy of that substantive right without the procedural limitations which Congress
attached to it.... [W]e do not believe that a statutory enactment... may be parsed as
discretely as appellee urges. Congress was obviously intent on according a measure of
statutory job security to governmental employees which they had not previously enjoyed,
but was likewise intent on excluding more elaborate procedural requirements which it felt
would make the operation of the new scheme unnecessarily burdensome in practice.
Where the focus of legislation was thus strongly on the procedural mechanism for
enforcing the substantive right which was simultaneously conferred, we decline to
conclude that the substantive right may be viewed wholly apart from the procedure
provided for its enforcement. The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guarantee
against removal without cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee as enforced by the
36
procedures which Congress has designated for the determination of cause.
Is it really the case that the applicability of the constitutional right of due process of law
turns on an essentially extraconstitutional inquiry? Justice Rehnquist is convinced, at
least, that the proper analytical bias gives precedence to congressional understandings:
To conclude otherwise would require us to hold that although Congress chose to enact
what was essentially a legislative compromise, and with unmistakable clarity granted
governmental employees security against being dismissed without "cause," but refused to
accord them a full adversary hearing for the determination of "cause," it was
constitutionally disabled from making such a choice.... Neither the language of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor our cases construing it require any such
37
hobbling restrictions on legislative authority in this area.

This much is clear: Over and over, within this period at least, Justice Rehnquist, in
the course of working through nominally constitutional questions, presented as decisive
non-constitutional legal documents, practices and institutions---on their own terms,
carefully considered. In Paul v. Davis,38 Kentucky's decision to cast its legal protection
of individual reputation in the form of tort liability rules rather than direct recognition of
39
a property interest ultimately determined the outcome of the due process inquiry.

35
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 560-61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Arnett, 416 U.S. at 152.
Id. at 154.
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Id. at 693-7 10.

But the interest in reputation alone which respondent seeks to vindicate in this action in federal
court is quite different from the "liberty" or "property" recognized in those decisions. Kentucky
law does not extend to respondent any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation which has
been altered as a result of petitioners' actions. Rather his interest in reputation is simply one of a
number which the State may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a forum for
vindication of those interests by means of damages actions. And any harm or injury to that interest,
even where as here inflicted by an officer of the State, does not result in a deprivation of any
"liberty" or "property" recognized by state or federal law, nor has it worked any change of
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Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., for example, depicted constitutional analysis of
"state action" as not much more than a collection of catch phrases; instead, described
closely the Pennsylvania procedure within which the electric company disclosed the
termination practices alleged to be inconsistent with due process of law; and taking the
state procedure on its own terms, found no regulatory "imprimatur," and therefore no
state action.40 Sosna v. Iowa upheld a durational residency requirement limiting the
ability of newly arrived residents to obtain divorces. 4 1 Familiar constitutional law
starting points like the right to travel and the fundamental interest of individuals in
obtaining divorces were briefly noted but set to the side. 42 State legal strategy and
43
"settled principles of Iowa practice and pleading" were conclusive.
Sosna is one of quite a few opinions in which Justice Rehnquist explained the
irrelevance of constitutional concerns through a careful, appreciative description of nonconstitutional choices, objectives, and institutional settings. Parker v. Levy stressed the
"long recognized" status of the military as "a specialized society separate from civilian

respondent's status as theretofore recognized under the State's laws. For these reasons we hold that
the interest in reputation asserted in this case is neither "liberty" nor "property" guaranteed against
state deprivation without due process of law.
Id. at 711-12.
40. 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
[I]t is less than clear under state law that Metropolitan was even required to file this provision as
part of its tariff or that the Commission would have had the power to disapprove it. The District
Court observed that the sole connection of the Commission with this regulation was Metropolitan's
simple notice filing with the Commission and the lack of any Commission action to prohibit it.
Id. at 355 (footnotes omitted).
At most, the Commission's failure to overturn... amounted to no more than a determination that a
Pennsylvania utility was authorized to employ such a practice if it so desired. Respondent's
exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the initiative comes from it and not from the
State, does not make its action in doing so "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 357 (footnote omitted).
41. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
42. Id. at 405-06.
43. Id. at 407-08 n. 20.
Where a divorce decree is entered after a finding of domicile in ex parte proceedings, this Court has
held that the finding of domicile is not binding upon another State and may be disregarded in the
face of "cogent evidence" to the contrary. For that reason, the State asked to enter such a decree is
entitled to insist that the putative divorce petitioner satisfy something more than the bare minimum
of constitutional requirements before a divorce may be granted. The State's decision to exact a oneyear residency requirement as a matter of policy is therefore buttressed by a quite permissible
inference that this requirement not only effectuates state substantive policy but likewise provides a
greater safeguard against successful collateral attack than would a requirement of bona fide
residence alone. This is precisely the sort of determination that a State in the exercise of its
domestic relations jurisdiction is entitled to make.
Id. at 407-09 (citations omitted);
Our Brother MARSHALL argues in dissent that the Iowa durational residency requirement "sweeps
too broadly" since it is not limited to ex parte proceedings and could be narrowed by a waiver
provision. But Iowa's durational residency requirement cannot be tailored in this manner without
disrupting settled principles of Iowa practice and pleading. Iowa's rules governing special
appearances make it impossible for the state court to know, either at the time a petition for divorce
is filed or when a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction is filed, whether or not a respondent
will appear and participate in the divorce proceedings.
Id. at 407 n. 207 (citations omitted).
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society, 44 as undercutting enforcement of ordinary free speech protections: "The
fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of
discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be
''4
constitutionally impermissible outside it.
5 American Radio Assn. v. Mobile Steamship
Assn. showed a similar disinterest in close free speech analysis and accorded a similar
respect to the policies and interests underlying a state court injunction prohibiting union
"Buy American" picketing of foreign freight ships.4 6 Description of the structure of the
North Carolina court system was a sufficient counter to due process and equal protection
47
objections to the failure to appoint counsel for indigents at issue in Ross v. Moffit.
B.

The Appearanceof Multiplicity Overwhelms CanonicalEmphasis

Justice Rehnquist acknowledged "the tendency of all rights [is] 'to declare
themselves absolute to their logical extreme," 4 8 but he also held that the elaborating
logic of rights themselves, their own account of their "importance" and therefore
pertinence, "does not, by itself, determine [their] scope. '' 9 Within his accounts,
specification of the limits on constitutional rights-"scope"5°-was an external matter,
the work of non-constitutional bodies of law fixing constitutional law's applicability.
This structure was simply one illustration of a recurring tendency apparent in
Rehnquist's work in this period. He was, Justice Ginsburg might say, a determined antiOccamist (like Professor Tribe? 51). Justice Rehnquist's opinions routinely conceived of
legal questions as implicating several distinct constitutional or statutory or judicial
domains, notably proceeding without conveying any sense of canonical emphases,
52
treating various regimes as in principle equally significant.
In Richardson v. Ramirez,53 this preference for multiplication was deployed within
constitutional law. Justice Rehnquist held that the question of state exclusion of felons
from voting was not, as it might be ordinarily thought, a question implicating the Equal
Protection Clause of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather a matter
governed by section two, separately applicable, to be construed independently of usual

44. 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974); see Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 37 (1976) (distinguishing "civilian
community" and "military community" for Sixth Amendment purposes).
45. Parker,417 U.S. at 758; see also Kelley v Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976) (discussing regulation of
police personal appearance).
46. 419 U.S. 215, 229-30 (1974).
47. 417 U.S. 600 (1974); see also U.S. v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 327 (1976) (plurality) (stating the
constitutionality of statutory delegation to district court judges of indigents' rights to transcripts in habeas
proceedings turns on "essentially practical judgment on questions" that courts of appeals confront more often
than the Supreme Court and thus the Supreme Court should defer to the views of the courts of appeals
regarding constitutionality).
48. Ross, 417 U.S. at 611-12 (quoting Hudson Co. Water Co. v. McCarter,209 U.S. 249, 355 (1980)).
49. Mich. v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974).
50. Id.
51. See supran. 16 and accompanying text.
52. Justice Rehnquist was hardly unique in recognizing that legal analysis could proceed by treating "law"
as an aggregate of more or less separated regimes. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Persistenceof ClassicalStyle,
131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 663, 686-98 (1983) ("proliferation of legal media"). But he put this recognition to work, it
appears, with unusual enthusiasm.
53. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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equal protection preoccupations. 54 More often, however, the tendency to multiply is
evidenced in opinions in which seemingly threshold questions of jurisdiction or
procedure, or other seemingly peripheral complexities, are explored with pronounced
enthusiasm and depth, as matters no less significant than the so-called "merits" of the
particular cases; indeed in some cases without regard to whether the threshold questions
block reaching the "merits" or not. 55 Rizzo v. Goode, of course, shows off Rehnquist's
multiplicity at its most churrigueresque. 56 Analysis proceeds through three main stages,
each verging on definitive resolution, but nonetheless overlaid by the next. A
constitutional discussion of justiciability, suggesting that no individual plaintiffs could
show a sufficiently real risk of suffering further acts of police brutality, concludes
abruptly with recitation of the fact of class action certification and a supposition that the
justiciability issue recedes, leading to a discussion of requirements of the section 1983
cause of action, seemingly not met, itself superseded by a final discussion of remedial
considerations pointing towards abstention. 57 It is clear that plaintiffs lose, in a sense
two or almost three times over, but no single, settled conclusion emerges.
C.

National League of Cities as Hodgepodge

National League of Cities, it appears, was not Rizzo. Justice Rehnquist worked
within only one body of law-constitutional law as ordinarily conceived. National
League of Cities was not like Arnett and company either. Rehnquist addressed and
sought to define, it appears, affirmative constitutional protections (of state sovereignty,
in this instance), rather than set limits. Not exactly: Mark Tushnet's characterization of
the National League of Cities opinion as "fundamentally incoherent ' 58 begged important
questions (for example, whether and why "coherence" is a pertinent criterion for judging
Supreme Court majority opinions generally 59), but it also underscored as important what
every reader of the opinion notices.
National League of Cities is a hodgepodge. It incorporates examples of exercises
of state sovereignty, but no efforts to extract any but the most general common elements;
a long list of government projects that might be (or already had been) made more costly,
and that potentially might be (or already were) constrained by extension of federal wage
and hour requirements-again, without any real attempt to articulate criteria for testing
significance; and another list of "typical" state or local programs to some degree taken
over, at least with respect to decisions regarding employment structure, by the federal

54. See id at 54-55; see also Intl. Tel. & Telegraph Corp. v. Loc. 134, 419 U.S. 428 (1975) (usual APA
understandings of "adjudication" and separation of functions gives way to more specialized understandings
implicit in NLRA provisions addressing jurisdictional disputes of the sort at issue).
55. Several 1975 opinions are illustrative. See eg. Weinberger v Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); U.S. v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Intercounty Const. Corp. v Walter, 422 U.S. 1 (1975); Philbrook v. Glodgett,
421 U.S. 707 (1975); Train v. Nat. Resources Def Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619
(1975).
56. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
57. Id. at 371-80.
58. Tushnet, supra n. 13, at 636 n. 50.
59. 1 proceed here-as in the rest of this section-supposing that Justice Rehnquist had enough control over
the content of his opinions to permit me to treat the work as his own. This is not necessarily the case, of
course, given that nine Justices ordinarily participate in deciding the cases that the Supreme Court hears.
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rules; again unaccompanied by serious attempt at analytical resolution.
The opinion
also includes quite a few asides-even while it repeatedly insists on the importance of
state sovereignty-suggesting limits to the decision's reach. A way was left open for
excepting congressional acts enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 1 (Justice Rehnquist
himself would write Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer, seizing this opportunity only four days later. 62)
States and localities might be able to waive constitutional protection as a condition for
receiving federal funds. 63 The long-time attempt to distinguish "governmental" and
"proprietary" undertakings of state and local governments remained available as a way to
identify another proper zone for federal wage and hour regulation. 64 Rehnquist also
reserved the question of what impact National League of Cities would have on
65
congressional exercises of the war power.
Perhaps NationalLeague of Cities internalizes (or only partially represses) Justice
Rehnquist's predilection for conceiving of law as an aggregation of separate and distinct
domains, each setting limiting conditions on the others, no settled ordering emerging. In
this period at least, Rehnquist's work is paradoxically of a piece. There is no "there"
66
there: all parts, no wholes. The cases become versions of Gertrude Stein's Oakland.
D.

Altogether JerrybuiltArrangements

It is as though Justice Rehnquist seized and jammed inside each other the internal
67
and external perspectives that H.L.A. Hart distinguished in The Concept of Law.
Component parts of the overall legal regime figure as limits on the applicability of other
parts, in terms extrinsic to the limited domains, interacting contingently and
unpredictably, as perceived internally, within the terms of any particular part. This
distinctive structure, glimpsed in the Rehnquist opinions written around the time of
National League of Cities, would surely have counted as "brilliant" as Daniel Farber
understood the term. We might wonder, perhaps following Farber's prompting, what we
ought to make of Rehnquist's structure.
No single domain-for example, the
constitutional law of individual rights--can claim precedence, or (within its own
perspective) more than unpredictably intermittent pertinence. The commitments of every
body of law, like those of the federal statute considered in Arnett, are qualified or
gapped. There are, it appears, only underenforced norms within every legal domain-an
68
altogether jerrybuilt arrangement.
Perhaps not: If the relevant perspective is that of a judge altogether removed from

60. See Natl. League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 843-46, 846-47, 848-51. The recurring themes in the
Rehnquist opinions that I have pointed out, and the distinctiveness of those themes (something I have treated as
self-evident), together suggest that Justice Rehnquist was likely responsible for much of what we find in the
opinions published in his name.
61. Id. at 852 n. 17.
62. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
63. See Natl. League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 n. 17.
64. See id. at 854-55 n. 18.
65. See id
66. See Jon Winokur, The Traveling Curmudgeon 49 (Sasquatch Books 2003) (Stein's view of Oakland).
67. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford U. Press 1961).
68 See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213-20 (1978).
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within the point of view of any particular domain-the judge ex ante. If this judge
identifies, in each case, the pertinent body of law, on the basis of some overarching
criterion external to each and all of the aggregated parts, the structure as a whole might
be "coherent" even if each part were irregularly gapped. In a lecture delivered at the
University of Miami in 1978, Justice Rehnquist stated what might be taken to be a
methodological premise (and, of course, a notable substantive bias)-the priority of
authority:
[J]ust as surely as we must strive to maintain a maximum amount of individual liberty, we
must realize that authority, too, has its claim in a constitutional republic such as ours.
Indeed, the very idea of law is ultimately based on the authority of the state to enforce that
law, as events throughout our Nation's history have on more than one occasion
demonstrated. Authority in this sense of69the word is... the indispensable condition of all
government, including self-government.
Assuming that "we" addresses, in the first instance, the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court, something like an adjudicative algorithm emerges. In each case
the "claim" of authority-the plausibility of the grounds of its exercise, the good faith of
its exercise-point to whichever of the contingently overlapping bodies of law affords
the most apt terms for articulating the "claim." This "authoritarianism, ''7° however, is
neither naive nor inevitably apologetic. The process of sorting alternate legal orders, of
testing terms as evocative (or not) of plausibility or good faith, induces a measure of
judicious skepticism, touching both terms and claims. Claims of authority that do not fit
readily within available terms lose credibility. Justice Rehnquist's "authoritarianism" is
therefore to some degree self-limiting, within the aggregative legal order he depicts;
appropriate to a legal order-although some may worry only barely so-that includes
constitutional law among its parts.

IV.

WHAT PROFESSORS MICHELMAN AND TRIBE DID

Of course, an opposite starting point is also evident, since 1971 or so already well
named by John Rawls--"the priority of liberty.'71 There is thus nothing surprising in
supposing that in 1977 Professors Michelman and Tribe were, at some level, drawn to
the National League of Cities opinion precisely because it was an opinion preoccupied
with "state sovereignty, ' 72 an especially apt occasion for attempting to counter the
"authoritarianism" already evident in the Rehnquist corpus, even if not yet fully
articulated-to show-off especially dramatically (Farber was not wrong in perceiving an
element of political theater) the equal applicability of the opposed perspective. What is
interesting, all the same, is the difference in the approaches that Michelman and Tribe
took.

69. William H. Rehnquist, The Adversary Society, 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 17 (1978).
70. Id.
71. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice243-51 (Harvard U. Press 197 1).
72. "State sovereignty" is referenced twenty-six times in the opinion. 426 U.S. at 842, 843, 845, 848, 849,
852, 855, 858, 860-62, 864-66, 868-69, 871-73, 877.
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Frank Michelman EmbracedNancy Reagan

Just say no: Remarkably, Professor Michelman never acknowledged Justice
Rehnquist to be the author of the National League of Cities majority opinion-indeed,
73
"Rehnquist" showed up only four times, in other connections, all in footnotes.
Michelman most often attributed National League of Cities to "the Justices" or "the
Court." 74 But Justice Brennan appeared at least six times in main text, 7 5 including the
very first sentence: "A share of the blame for what follows belongs to Mr. Justice
Brennan, whose twenty years of distinguished labor on behalf of our constitutional
system-on behalf, I should say, of the men, women, and children whose rights and
concerns that system serves. ' 76
Michelman, it should be apparent, insisted on
continuity, presented "our constitutional system" as persisting unchanged. He supposed,
therefore, that the parts of that system were relatively well-defined and capable of
disciplined
expansion.
This obviously conservative methodological
bias,
understandably, led to close examination of the "state sovereignty" notions evoked in
National League of Cities, in order to determine whether these notions possessed the
required attributes.
The casual face of Justice Rehnquist's opinion-the absence of any real effort to
treat "state sovereignty" in terms suggestive of precise criteria-was plainly
unsatisfactory within Professor Michelman's perspective. 77 There was nonetheless,
Michelman thought, real substance implicit in National League of Cities: "[T]he
Court... was using 'sovereignty' to stand-rather unexpectedly-for nothing more nor
less than the state's role of providing for the interests of its citizens in receiving
important social services. ' 78 The question then became how to describe the "special
constitutional place" of this notion of state sovereignty "in a way that would make
[National League of Cities] respectable if not incontrovertibly right." 79 Provision of
these services "might be construed as a political expression of society's commitment to
the principle that individuals ought to be provided with some level of services without
having to pay specially for them." 80 This principle, Michelman supposed, could be fit
within constitutional law in only one way (this is the point at which his methodological
conservatism bit hard): "Only constitutional recognition of an interest as a 'right' can
provide such a basis." 8 1 This "reconstruction" of National League of Cities was-he
' 82
acknowledged--"a very big surprise.
It also carried a strong implication:
[T]he social service role is treated as a part of the legal conception of what it means to be a

73. See Michelman, supra n. 3, at 1174 n. 36, 1176 n. 39, 1186 n. 68.
74. See e.g. id. at 1166, 1180.
75. Seeid at 1165, 1166, 1184,1192,1193.
76. Id.at 1165. The Michelman article appears in a symposium honoring Justice Brennan-this may
explain some of the citations, but it also underscores the anomaly.
77. See id.at 1167-73.
78. See Michelman, supra n. 3, at 1172.
79. Id. at 1173.
80. Id. at 1179.
81. Id.at 1176 (emphasis omitted).
82. Id.at 1180.
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state within the.., system established by the Constitution. Since it is that same
Constitution that enjoins those same states from depriving persons of "life, liberty, or
property" unreasonably and from denying persons "the equal protection of the laws,"
how.., can the states not be "acting" insofar as they fail to perform that same serviceproviding role that they, in order to prevail in [National League of Cities] must claim as a
part of their character as "states." Whatever choice the state makes regarding its
arrangements ... is a choice it makes as a state and for which it is, therefore, accountable

under Fourteenth Amendment standards
of reasonableness, fairness, good faith (or
83
whatever), and nondiscrimination.
Must courts themselves be able to define constitutionally basic services?
Fourteenth Amendment "standards" did not require that judges take up this task:
The general idea ... is that judicial incapacity, without legislative assistance, to give
concrete content or effect to certain inchoate rights does not imply judicial incapacity to
seize upon political actions that are visibly responsive to those inchoate rights, and
thereafter to regulate institutional
frameworks with a view to protecting the claims that
84
grow out of political actions.
National League of Cities might serve not only as "a shield" for state and local
governments subjected to burdensome congressional regulation, but also as "Excalibur"
for plaintiffs seeking to enforce a right to hitherto free social services that state or local
85
governments might try to cease providing.
B.

Laurence Tribe Embraced William Rehnquist

Professor Tribe has no trouble associating National League of Cities with Justice
Rehnquist, at the very point that Tribe identified his own point of departure: "The
language of NationalLeague of Cities is indeed quite consistent with a protected state
role premised on individual rights. In fact, Justice Rehnquist seems sometimes to lay the
foundations for precisely such a theory." 86 Tribe, though, did not concentrate his
attention on Rehnquist's opinion in the way that Michelman did-his is not so much an
internal critique, rather (he writes) an attempt to pull out one thread of thinking, an
"unraveling" (his title is dead-on) that reveals the thread to be one also found in "an
established fabric of doctrine and theory." 87 National League of Cities is quickly
grouped, 88 inter alia, with Shapiro v. Thompson,89 Goldberg v. Kelly,90 San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriquez,9 1 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish92-all
"interstitial doctrinal sources of protection," starting points for invalidating congressional

83.
84.
85.
at 878
86.
87.

See Michelman, supra n. 3, at 1185 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
ld. at 1191.
Id. at 1185. This is, of course, the image that provoked David Currie's riposte. See Currie, supra n. 17,
n. 79.
Tribe, supra n. 3, at 1075.
Id. at 1078.

88. See id. at 1078-90.
89.
90.
91.
92.

394
397
411
300

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

618 (1969).
254 (1970).
1 (1973).
379 (1937).
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93
action threatening "the deprivation of subsistence rights."
These juxtapositions are surprising ("I make no claim in this Article to be
describing what the Justices actually intended." 94). But surprises come not just because

National League of Cities appears to be the "odd opinion out." It is not: We may well
wonder-given its result-why Rodriquez belongs in this group. Every case, it turns
out, is one that Professor Tribe reads differently, in ways that depart from usual
emphases, that reveal "threads" in these opinions too that are not immediately apparent.
It is a tour de force. The obviousness of the virtuosity, however, raises the question of its
point: If the grouping requires this much work, why is it persuasive? (Farber, Farber,
Farber.) Earlier in the article, in a footnote discussing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp.,9 5 Tribe resorts to a different metaphor:
I mean to say nothing about the conscious purposes of the Justices in making the
distinctions they have; at the same time, I find it difficult to believe that either coincidence
alone, or even a determined desire on my part to pour the cases into a certain mold, could
satisfyingly account for the quite remarkable way in which otherwise perplexing and
unconnected lines may be seen as linked in a single diagram. Although any such
supposition is necessarily speculative, the almost magnetic force that seems to bring the
lines into a coherent pattern could well be an underlying structure of beliefs about human
rights and their importance-a structure that might unite judges and commentators of
obviously different political and ideological leanings, if not
at the level of doctrine then at
96
least at the level of doctrinal boundaries and distinctions.
This is the voice, we recognize, of the author of American ConstitutionalLaw,
writing right around the moment of its publication, knowing nothing (or not much) of
what the reaction to that treatise would be, but conscious perhaps that some readers at
least might find it "extravagant" (to use Justice Ginsburg's word, if not her own
judgment 97 ). Surprising connections-and Professor Tribe's remarkable ability to make
them seem somehow "underlying"98-would (we know now) be one principal reason for
the treatise's triumph. We also know, though, that the "underlying" 99 conjunctions
would often work, would often persuade, even if the reader also acknowledged that the
'1
particular "coherent pattern"tO
was not the only possible one. Tribe showed the
Supreme Court's readings of constitutional law to be super-saturated. Within the cases
in the aggregate there are always cues pointing to arrangements and arguments with
claims to serious attention that differ, sometimes substantially, from other cues,
arrangements, and arguments-and maybe not just one or two others. There is (the
canonist might think) too much "there" there.
Professor Tribe, thus, agreed with Justice Rehnquist and disagreed with Professor
Michelman. The individual opinion-NationalLeague of Cities, say-is not "[a]nalyzed

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Tribe, supra n. 3, at 1089; id at 1090.
Id. at 1078.
426 U.S. 794 (1976); see Tribe, supra n. 3, at 1072-74 n. 34.
Tribe, supra n. 3, at 1073-74 n. 34.
See Ginsburg, supra n. 16, at 344.
Tribe, supra n. 3, at 1065.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 1072-74 n. 34.
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to the bottom," its meaning a matter of "plumbing the depths." 10 1 It is, rather, a surface
thing, an accumulation of glimpses. Rehnquist opinions contingently advertised the
seeming randomness of the legal propositions accumulated and treated as decisive (a
second randomness). These opinions advertise the fragility of the idea of principle-of
the notion that constitutional law or any other body of law could claim some persisting
deep structure. But for Tribe-here he turned away from Rehnquist and (partly) toward
Michelman-the opinion itself may be merely an accumulation of phrases and
references, but it is also therefore directional (or multi-directional), pointing towards
possible conjunctions possibly suggesting "underlying" 102 orders. Professor Tribe, we
can see, directly challenged Justice Rehnquist:
I make no claims about what the Justices intended or "really had in mind." I haven't a clue
what that might have been, but I doubt that the conclusion of this Article was it. I will be
arguing about the logic, not the motives, of the Court's action. And I will be arguing about
that logic with a purpose of my own: to enlist that logic-while remaining faithful to its
premises-in the search, perhaps delayed but not defeated, for a just constitutional
order. 103
Every case that might appear to be a demonstration of the arbitrary, never-certain
pertinence of constitutional law is also, potentially, a pointer to resources within
constitutional law that reveal persuasive conjunctions and arguments (even if never
definitively so), therefore reasserting the pertinence of constitutional law, now footed in
the aggregate of cases, free of the inadequacy of individual opinions.
V.

THEN

Now

If we take into account the larger collection of opinions that Justice Rehnquist was
assembling in the period, the efforts of Professors Tribe and Michelman fit well within
an on-going clash of obvious and unusual importance. It was, we might think, an
extraordinary moment-"brilliance" was probably not "normal," but it was also probably
a not-surprising side effect (as it were) of the hard work that the moment appears to have
invited.
Isn't this just ancient history? Maybe not: An important recent Supreme Court
decision that puts in play a century-old opinion written by Justice Holmes points to a
new (also old) context within which the Tribe and Michelman efforts ultimately acquire
added constitutional resonance-indeed, real textual footing. Seeing this, I should warn
at the outset, requires an extended exposition.
A.

Tennessee Copper in 2007

In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, decided last April, the
United States Supreme Court, although dividing 5-4, ruled that the EPA possessed
authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other

101. Michelman, supran. 3, at 1194.
102. Tribe, supra n. 3, at 1065.
103. Id.at 1066.
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greenhouse gases 104 and that the refusal of the EPA, as of the time of the Court's
decision, to undertake such regulation was founded in no reason that the Clean Air Act
marked as pertinent, and was therefore arbitrary and capricious. 10 5 These are obviously
both important rulings. 10 6 But the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens devoted
about as much attention to the threshold question of whether Massachusetts, as a State,
had standing to challenge the EPA failure to act. 10 7 Chief Justice Roberts consideredat substantial length--only the standing question. 108
The State of Massachusetts held title to property bordering the Atlantic Ocean that
10 9
faced possible endangerment by rising waters that could result from global warming.
The potential danger might be offset, to some currently undeterminable extent, if the
EPA pursued a regulatory course sufficiently more aggressive than its present, relatively
laid back approach." 0 Chief Justice Roberts contended that a private property owner
could not claim standing in these circumstances. 1 Both prospective injury and the
ability of the EPA to prevent or reduce injury turned on too much speculation.11 2 Justice
Stevens, however, thought that the interests of states were different in kind from those of
private property owners, and that the risks posed to the State's own property were simply
illustrative of considerations that Massachusetts itself could choose to decide were
presently relevant, and (having so decided) invoke as a basis for proceeding in federal
court. 113

Stevens quoted Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court one hundred years
earlier in Tennessee Copper:
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that
capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all
the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. 114
Massachusetts, the majority opinion concluded, "is entitled to special solicitude in our
standing analysis." 115 The State's determination that it needed to act "to preserve its
sovereign authority today" was sufficiently "well-founded" to establish standing. 116 The
affidavits that Massachusetts included with the complaint it filed in federal district court
showed that "the rise in sea levels associated with global warming has already harmed
and will continue to harm Massachusetts," that "[t]he risk of catastrophic harm, though
remote, is nevertheless real," and that the "risk would be reduced to some extent" if the

104.
105.
106.
107.

127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462.
Id. at 1463.
See e.g. id. at.1446, 1458 (discussing the dangers associated with global warming).
Id. at 1452-58.

dissenting).
108. Id. at 1463-71 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,

109. 127 S. Ct. at 1456.
110. Seeid.at1458.

dissenting).
111. See id at 1465 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
112. See id.at1470.
113. Id. at 1454-55.
114. 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (quoting 206 U.S. at 237).

115. Id.at1455.
116. Id.at1454.
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1 17
of emissions of greenhouse gas.
EPA were to undertake more aggressive regulation
118
Massachusetts could therefore claim standing.
Chief Justice Roberts insisted that there was good reason why Massachusetts itself
"never cited Tennessee Copper... before this Court or the D.C. Circuit," why "not one

of the legion of amici ...

ever cited the case," and "why not one of the three judges

writing below ever cited the case either."' 119 Tennessee Copper addressed the question
of entitlement to equitable relief, holding only that the distinctive interests of a state
provided a basis for an injunction in circumstances in which private property owners
would be relegated to damages actions. 120 "The case had nothing to do with Article III
standing." 12 1 Article III does not "somehow implicitly treat[ ] public and private
' 122
litigants differently."
Taken in isolation, several of the propositions that the Roberts dissent asserts are
easy to criticize. Article III, section 2, forthrightly announces that the "judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity."' 1 23 There are other requirements, of
course, but the "Cases" and "Controversies" condition, 12 4 it is usually thought, is
ordinarily met given equity jurisdiction (which precisely describes who can seek what
"Standing" was first of all an equity notion itself.125 Article III, moreover,
plainly does too "implicitly treat[ ] public and private litigants differently." 126 Chisholm
v. Georgia127 was wrong, most of us learned in law school. (Who taught the Chief
Justice constitutional law?)
If it were not already clear, Chief Justice Rehnquist
confirmed conventional wisdom when he declared Hans v. Louisiana12 8 to be
constitutional law,129 and not just a decision about equity jurisdiction (as the Hans
opinion itself seemed to suggest3°). Article III, even without the help of the Eleventh
Amendment, marks states as different, extending the "original Jurisdiction" of the
Supreme Court to "all Cases ... in which a State shall be Party" 13 1-but
not,
conspicuously, to cases initiated by private parties. Tennessee Copper was one such
original case, 132 and Justice Holmes was plainly concerned in part with mapping how
equity jurisdiction changed because the State of Georgia had brought the injunctive
when.)

117. Id. at 1458.
118. Id.
119. 127 S. Ct. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
120. See td. at1465 (referencing Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 236-38).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. U.S. Const. art. lII, § 2.
124. Id.
125. See Henry R. Hart & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 170 (Foundation
Press 1953); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L.
Rev. 1371, 1417-57 (1988); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine? 102
Mich. L. Rev. 689 (2004).
126. 127 S.Ct. at 1465 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
127. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
128. 134 U.S. 1(1890).
129. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
130. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 9-10 (Harlan, J., concurring).
131. U.S. Cont. art. III, § 2.
132. 206 U.S. at 236.
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action. 133 But he began his discussion by describing the distinctive "capacity" in which
Georgia sued134-what we might take to be the "standing" part of his opinion-with the
remedial details following as corollaries (not as independently given.)
Chief Justice Roberts, though, was also right to wonder. Justice Harlan had written
a concurring opinion in Tennessee Copper on all fours with Roberts's own thinking:
When the Constitution gave this court original jurisdiction in cases "in which a State shall
be a party," it was not intended, I think, to authorize the court to apply... any principle or
rule of equity that would not be applied, under the same facts, in suits wholly between
private parties .... Georgia is entitled to the relief sought, not because it is a State, but

because it is a party which has established its right to such relief by proof The opinion [of
Justice Holmes], if I do not mistake its scope, proceeds largely upon the ground that this
court... owes some special duty to Georgia as a state ...while
under the same facts, it
13 5
would not owe any such duty to the plaintiff, if an individual.
Was Holmes wrong? Why rest the important Massachusetts decision on an opinion,
ignored in the course of litigation, announced one hundred years ago, but also one
hundred twenty years after the drafting of the Constitution?
Holmes wrote after the fashion of an idiosyncratic genius. "[T]he State has an
interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within
its domain. It has the last word.'136 Georgia is alone and godlike, standing apart from
its citizens, deciding the fate of mountains and air-Wagnerian constitutional law! The
Tennessee Copper opinion itself, though, turns out not to stand alone. It was neither the
Supreme Court's "last word" nor its first.
B.

After Tennessee Copper

Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Cleary, decided in 1936, concerned a
suit brought by Wisconsin banking officials challenging the constitutionality of a federal
statute authorizing state-chartered, state-regulated savings banks, upon a majority vote of
shareholders, to convert their institutions to federally-chartered savings associations
subject to federal regulation. 13 7 The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion, written by
Justice Cardozo, held that the congressional legislation was inconsistent with the Tenth
Amendment, in the process addressing the question of state standing (citing Tennessee
Coppertwice):
As against the protest of the state, asserting its public policy or the prohibition of a statute,
no assent by shareholders, however general or explicit, will be permitted to prevail. It is of
no moment in such conditions that the interest of the state in repelling the encroachment is
other than pecuniary. At least there is "a matter of grave public concern in which the state,
as the representative of the public has an interest apart from that of the individuals
affected." In its capacity of quasi-sovereign, the state repulses an assault upon the quasipublic institutions that are the product and embodiment of its statutes and its policy....

133.
134.
135
136.
137.

See id. at 237.
Id.
Id.at 239-40 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 237 (majority).
296 U.S. 315 (1935).
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In the creation of corporations of this quasi-public order and in keeping them thereafter
within the limits of their charters, the state is parens patriae, acting in a spirit of
benevolence for the welfare of its citizens. Shareholders and creditors have assumed a
relation to the business in the belief that the assets will be protected by all the power of the
government against use for other ends than those stated in the charter .... True, most of
the shareholders.., assented to the change. Even so, an important minority were not
represented at the meetings, and their approval is not shown. Creditors other than
have not been heard from at all. To these non-vocal classes the parens owes a
shareholders
13 8
duty.
Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 139 a truly extraordinary antitrust action,
invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, alleging an elaborate price-fixing
conspiracy on the part of some twenty railroad companies that "in purpose and effect
give manufacturers, sellers and other shippers in the North an advantage over
' 4°
The result of the conspiracy, the
manufacturers, shippers and others in Georgia. 1
complaint charged, was "to deny.., many of Georgia's products equal access ...to the
national market," "to limit ...the Georgia economy to staple agricultural products," "to
frustrate and counteract the measures taken by the State to... promote the general
progress and welfare of its people," and "to hold the Georgia economy in a state of
arrested development.' ' 14 1 Writing for five Justices, Justice Douglas concluded that
Georgia was suing to vindicate its own interests-and not "in reality for the benefit of
' 142
particular individuals."
Georgia sues as a proprietor to redress wrongs suffered by it as the owner of a railroad and
as the owner and operator of various public institutions.... But Georgia is not confined to
suits designed to protect only her proprietary interests. The rights which Georgia asserts,
parenspatriae,are those arising from an alleged... price-fixing scheme, it is said, [that]
has injured the economy of Georgia. 143
discuss shortly) established that the interest in
Tennessee Copper (and predecessors I will
144
the state economy was interest enough.
Discriminatory rates are but one form of trade barriers. They may cause a blight no less
serious than the spread of noxious gas over the land or the deposit of sewage in the
streams. They may affect the prosperity and welfare of a State as profoundly as any
the development of a State or put
diversion of waters from the rivers.... They may arrest
145
it at a decided disadvantage in competitive markets.
Chief Justice Stone, asserting the position of the dissenters, did not deny the
possibility of a parenspatriae interest--only its relevance.
The federal government is parens patriaewith respect of the cause of action here alleged,
and not the State. The federal government alone stands in such relationship to the citizens

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 339-41 (citations onutted).
324 U.S. 439 (1945).
ld.at 444.
Id.
Id.
at 446.
Id.
at 447.
See Pa.R.R. Co., 324 U.S. at 447-49.
Id. at 450 (note "stream of commerce" echoes); cf Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 591.
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and inhabitants of the United States, as to permit the bringing of suit in their behalf, to
protect them from the violation of federal laws relating to interstate commerce. 146
Some forty years later, Justice White self-consciously synthesized Tennessee
Copper and Pennsylvania RailroadCo. in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex
rel. Barez147 :
[T]he State must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private
parties .... [A] State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being-both
physical and economic-of its residents in general.

[T]he State has an interest in... ensuring that the State and its residents are not excluded
14 8
from the benefits that are to flow from participation in the federal system.
And finally, Nebraska v. Wyoming concluded that federal failures to enforce
federal law governing water contracts fell within the compass of state interests justifying
parens patriae actions of the Tennessee Copper sort, thus allowing a state to sue the
United States itself (in this instance in order to assure successful operation of a consent
149
decree).
Wyoming argues only that the cumulative effect of the United States's failure to adhere to
the law governing the contracts undermines the operation of the decree.., and thereby
states a claim arising under the decree itself, one by which it seeks to vindicate its "quasisovereign" interests which are "independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the
150
earth and air within its domain."
C.

Before Tennessee Copper

The older sequence of cases begins-or may be taken to begin-with United States
v. Hughes, decided in 1850.151 Evidently, the United States sold the same land twice
152
and the United States Attorney brought an action to undo the second transaction.
Counsel for Hughes, the second purchaser, argued that "the United States have no
interest in this suit, but interpose only as an act of grace, officiating only in the office of
prerogative." 153
The United States in selling land, and in all matters of contract, does not assert its
sovereignty, but acts as a citizen. Constitutional governments cannot pronounce their own
deeds void for any cause.
It is against public policy, that the land-officers should elect their favorite between two
citizens claiming the same land by purchase, and involve the United States as a partisan in

146. Id.
at 474 (Stone, C.J., Roberts, Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
147. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
148 Id.
at 607-08; see id. at 604-06 (discussing Tenn. Copper and Pa. R.R. Co.).
149. 515 U.S. 1 (1995).
150. Id.
at 20 (citation omitted) (quoting Okla. ex reL Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 393 (1938) (quoting
Tenn. Copper,206 U.S. at 237)).
151. 52U.S. 552(1850).
152. Id.
at 554-56.
153. Id.
at 561-62.
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15 4

The Supreme Court, however, accepted
conclusion.

the premise but drew an opposite

It is manifest that, if the agents of an individual had been thus imposed on, the conveyance
could be set aside because of mistake on part of such agents, and fraud on part of the
second purchaser, in order that the first contract could be complied with. Nor can it be
conceived why the government should stand on a different footing from any other
proprietor.
As the patent to Hughes is a conveyance of the fee, the United States stand divested of the
legal title, and therefore cannot fulfill their engagement with Goodbee [the first purchaser]
and his alienees, to whom they stand bound for a legal title, until the grant to Hughes is
55
annulled.1
United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co.,156 a case factually not too different from
Hughes, restated the rule:
[S]ince the right of the government.., to institute such a suit depends upon the same
general principles which would authorize a private citizen to apply to a court of justice for
relief against an instrument obtained from him by fraud or deceit, or any of those other
practices which are admitted to justify a court in granting relief, the government must show
that, like the private individual, it has such an interest in the relief sought as entitles it to
move in the matter. If it be a question of property a case must be made in which the court
can afford a remedy in regard to that property; if it be a question of fraud which would
render the instrument void, the fraud must operate to the prejudice of the United States; and
if it is apparent that the suit is brought for the benefit of some third party, and that the
United States has no pecuniary interest in the remedy sought, and is under no obligation to
the party who will be benefited to sustain an action for his use; in short, if there does not
appear any obligation on the part of the United States to the public, or to any individual, or
any interest of its own, it can no more sustain such an action than any private person could
under similar circumstances.
[T]his interest or duty of the United States must exist as the foundation of the right of
action. 157

Just a few months later, however, Justice Miller-the author of the San Jacinto Tin
opinion-demonstrated some surprising implications of his earlier formulation.
"[O]bligation on the part of the United States ' 158 covered a lot. United States v.
American Bell Telephone Co. was a suit brought to cancel telephone patents issued to
Alexander Graham Bell. 159 Bell's lawyers invoked the San Jacinto Tin rule: "This
language is construed by counsel... to limit the relief granted at the instance of the
United States to cases in which it has a direct pecuniary interest." 160 No.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 562 (citations omitted).
Id. at 568.
125 U.S. 273 (1888).
Id. at 285-86.
Id. at 286.
128 U.S. 315 (1888).
Id. at 367.
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It was evidently in the mind of the court that the case before it was one where the property
right to the land in controversy was the matter of importance, but it was careful to say that
the cases in which the instrumentality of the court cannot thus be used are those where the
United States has no pecuniary interest in the remedy sought, and is also under no
obligation to the party who will be benefited to sustain an action for his use, and also where
it does not appear that any obligation existed on the part of the United States to the public
or to any individual. The essence of the right of the United States to interfere in the present
case is its obligation to protect the public from the monopoly of the patent which was
procured by fraud.t 6 1
62
The would-be private action has become a public action.1
Seven years later, the full force of Miller's analysis was felt. In re Debsfamously and infamously-addressed an injunction sought and obtained by the United
States against a union boycott of Pullman sleeping cars included in trains running
throughout the Midwest-the boycott was meant to assist a worker strike at the Pullman
factory. 163 The boycott effectively shut down railroad operations in the Midwest, with
obvious national consequences. Issuance of the injunction led to contempt imprisonment
of Eugene V. Debs and other union leaders. 1 64 Did "the government" have "such an
interest in the subject-matter ... to appear as party plaintiff in this suit"? 165 "A
sufficient reply is that the United States have a property in the mails, the protection of
,,166

But Justice Brewer's opinion declared:
which was one of the purposes of this bill.
"We do not care to place our decision upon this ground alone."' 167 "It is obvious," given
San Jacinto Tin and American Bell
that while it is not the province of the government to interfere in any mere matter of private
controversy between individuals, or to use its great powers to enforce the rights of one
against another, yet, whenever the wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at
large, and are in respect of matters which by the constitution are entrusted to the care of the
Nation, and concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all the citizens of securing to
them their common rights, then the mere fact that the government has no pecuniary interest
in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts, or prevent it from taking
measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional duties.
The national government, given by the Constitution power to regulate interstate commerce,

161. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Miller noted that Hughes, was a similar case: "[T]he right of the
government to sustain the suit was based upon its legal or moral obligation to give a good title to another party
who had a prior and better claim to the land, but whose right was obstructed by the patent issued by the United

States." Id. at 368. Earlier in the opinion, Miller had foreshadowed his conclusion:
If such a fraud were practised [sic] upon an individual, he would have a remedy in any court.. .; but
it is said that the government of the United States-the representative of sixty millions of people,
acting for them, on their behalf and under their authority-can have no remedy against a fraud
which affects them all, and whose influence may be unlimited.
Id. at 357.
162. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing,81 Va. L. Rev. 387 (1995).
163. 158 U.S. 564.
164. See Nick Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs: The Citizen and Socialist (The Working Class in American
History) 131-38 (U. Illinois Press 1983).
165. Debs, 158 U.S. at 583.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 584.
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has by express statute assumed jurisdiction over such commerce when carried upon
railroads. It is charged, therefore,
with the duty of keeping those highways of interstate
16 8
commerce free from obstruction.

There are only a few stops on the way between Debs and Tennessee Copper.
Louisiana v. Texas, an original matter in the Supreme Court in 1900, involved a yellow
fever quarantine-allegedly over-restrictive-that Texas officials enforced against all
commercial goods transported from New Orleans. 169
Although Texas ultimately
prevailed, 170 Chief Justice Fuller's majority opinion relied directly on Debs, quoting
from the passage above, 17 1 to establish that Louisiana needed no "special and peculiar
injury such as would sustain an action by a private person. ' 172 "[T]he state.., presents
herself in the attitude of parens patriae, trustee, guardian, or representative of all her
citizens." 173 A year later, Missouri v. Illinois addressed Missouri's challenge to a plan
adopted by the Sanitary District of Chicago to discharge city sewers into the Mississippi
River. 174 Quoting Louisiana and its quotation of Debs,175 the majority opinion of
Justice Shiras treated Missouri's standing as clear: "But it must surely be conceded that,
if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the
proper party to represent and defend them." 176 The Missouri opinion is the only
177
decision Justice Holmes cited as supporting authority in Tennessee Copper.

VI.

THE DUTY TO PROTECT

(A MANIFESTO

OF SORTS)

The opinion that Justice Holmes wrote in Tennessee Copper was one in a long line.
Within the sequence, the Supreme Court addressed both original matters and cases on
appeal beginning in usual trial courts. The Court's opinions show that something like the
reasoning that Holmes deployed shows up in discussions of both equity jurisdiction and
justiciability-indeed, not surprisingly, the two categories overlap. Justice Stevens was
not "off the wall" in calling attention to Tennessee Copper in the Massachusetts majority

168. Id.at 586 (emphasis added). The duty, Justice Brewer thought, carried over to the judiciary as well. "If
ever there was a special exigency, one which demanded that the courts should do all that courts can do, it was
disclosed by this bill, and we need not turn to the public history of the day, which only reaffirms with clearest
emphasis all its allegations." Id.at 592.
169. 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
170. Id. at 22-23 (finding the acts of the health officer were not expressly authorized by the Texas governor).
171. Id. at 19.
172. Id.
173. Id. Justice Harlan disagreed. "The case involves no property interest of [Louisiana]. Nor is Louisiana
charged with any duty, nor has it any power, to regulate interstate commerce. Congress alone has authority in
that respect." La., 176 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J., concurring).
174. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
175. Id.at 234-38.
176. Id at 241.
177. 206 U.S. at 237. Justice Holmes also noted his own opinion for the Supreme Court in a subsequent
stage of the Missouri litigation, Mo. v. Ill.,
200 U.S. 496 (1906). There, he had proceeded cautiously in
evaluating the merits of the claim.
Itis a question of the first magnitude whether the destiny of the great rivers is to be the sewers of
the cities along their banks or to be protected against everything which threatens their purity. To
decide the whole matter at one blow by an irrevocable fit would be at least premature.
Id. at 521. The main issue concerned the increase in cholera death rates in St. Louis-Holmes thought that the
evidence was inconclusive regarding the impact of the sewage infiltration. See id.
at 522-26.
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opinion. Chief Justice Roberts, it seems, was wrong.
The Holmes opinion was nonetheless idiosyncratic in an important respect.
Tennessee Copper treats the interest of the state "in all the earth and air within its
domain" as an interest "independent of and behind the titles of its citizens."' 178 The
description is purely a description of property rights without any effort to explain or
justify their origin. This formulation recurs, we have seen, in Nebraska. But in other
Supreme Court opinions issued after 1907 there is a second emphasis. The State "owes a
duty,' ' 17 9 Justice Cardozo writes in Hopkins, to "protect[ ]" the "assets" of
"[s]hareholders and creditors"-this is the basis for state standing. 180 The "rights" that
Georgia asserts against the Pennsylvania Railroad, Justice Douglas explains, derive from
the "injur[y] [to] the economy of Georgia." 181 (Chief Justice Stone does not disagree
with the notion that a duty of government to protect and injury to the populace generally
(the economy) together confer standing-he just thinks that the federal government is the
relevant government.) Justice White frames his standing discussion similarly in
Snapp. 182 All of this is quite conclusory. This theme is more pronounced in opinions
preceding Tennessee Copper. American Bell emphasized the "obligation to protect the
public" 183 as the underpinning of United States' involvement in the action. Debs, we
have also seen, supplies the fullest statement:
[W]henever the wrongs complained of are such as to affect the public at large.... and
concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all the citizens of securing to them their
common rights, then the mere fact that the government has no pecuniary interest in the
controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts, or to prevent it from taking
measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional duties. 184
This "duty" emphasis, we realize, returns us to National League of Cities and
Professors Michelman and Tribe. Michelman stressed that his reading of Justice
' 185
Rehnquist's opinion yielded "intrinsic duties" and rights "to the state's protection.
Tribe's formulation reads like the application of Debs-in circumstances akin to those in
Nebraska v. Wyoming-to justify the adversary relationship of the state and federal
governments in NationalLeague of Cities:
[T]he state's right against the federal government... is derivative of the rights of its
residents against government. As a result, the state's only claim must be that ... when the
federal government leaves to states and localities the fulfillment of the government duty, it
cannot act
so as to undermine the ability of the states and their subdivisions to perform that
18 6
duty.
The seeming pertinence of Debs would be nothing more than an ironic curiosity

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

206 U.S. at 237.
296 U.S. at 341.
Id. at 340.
Pa.R.R. Co., 324 U.S. at 447.
See 458 U.S. at 600-08.
128 U.S. at 367.
158 U.S. at 586.
Michelman, supra n. 3, at 1194 (distinguishing Natl. League of Cities and Rizzo).
Tribe, supra n. 3, at 1090.
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except for the fact that the Debs formula is itself so obviously evocative. The reciprocal
relationship of allegiance and protection as the defining content of "citizenship" was a
recurring theme in Civil War and Reconstruction constitutional argument-famously (at
the time) the ground for the declaration of Attorney General Bates (made in advance of
the implementation of the Emancipation Proclamation) that "free" African Americans
were United States citizens (Dred Scott 187 to the contrary notwithstanding). 188 John
Mercer Langston-ex-slave, dean of the Howard University law school, drafter of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875-stressed "the duty of allegiance on the one part, and the right
of protection on the other" as not only the gist of Bates's thinking, but also as
"propositions... passed... through the 14th amendment, into the Constitution of the
United States." 189 Langston was, of course, precisely correct: The first sentence of
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment fixes federal and state citizenship, thus
imposing the duty of allegiance, in advance of the second sentence imposing upon states
the duty of affording "the equal protection of the laws," thus affording the right to
discharge that duty, a duty that section five of the Amendment also grants Congress the
right to enforce. This is-we can see-Professor Tribe's formulation in NationalLeague
of Cities with the emphases reversed: It was for Langston the "right of protection"
afforded Congress in the event of state failures to protect that mattered-and not, as in
National League of Cities, state efforts to meet their duty to protect in the face of
congressional interference or indifference.
This reconstruction reading of the Fourteenth Amendment reinforces the
supposition of both Professors Tribe and Michelman that the individual rights National
League of Cities protects are Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The Fourteenth
Amendment enacts a duty to protect. The idea of this duty-the fact of its status as
bottom-line constitutional obligation-survived the collapse of Reconstruction,
notwithstanding the notable attempt at erasure undertaken by Chief Justice Waite in
United States v. Cruikshank.190 The Debs usage and its later reiteration is evidence. So
too, it might be argued, evidence also lies in the stubborn insistence of federal judges
reading Chief Justice Rehnquist's DeShaney opinion against the grain1 9 1-as inviting
192
searching scrutiny of government responsibility in the face of seeming failures to act.
And there is more (too much to permit dismissal of particular manifestations as
idiosyncratic): A long history of allegiance/protection usage, evident in Jefferson's
Declaration of Independence,1 93 in Hobbes, 194 in Coke in Calvin's Case1 95-a usage,
187. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
188. 10Op.Aty. Gen. 382, 413 (1862).
189. John Mercer Langston, Equality before the Law (Oberlin, Pratt & Battle 1874) (reprinted in Great
Speeches by African Americans 49-50 (James Delay ed., Dover 2006)).
190. 92 U.S. 542, 550-52 (1875).
191. DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dept. ofSoc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). For discussion of some of the
history of the duty to protect in the context of a critique of DeShaney, see Steven J. Heyman, The FirstDuty of
Government- Protection,Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 Duke L.J. 507 (1991).
192. See e.g. Breen v Tex. A&M U., 485 F.3d 325, 332-38 (5th Cir 2007); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield,
439 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). The so-called "state created danger" doctnne that these decisions illustrate is
often read quite restrictively-but cases resting on this theory continue to present themselves to courts
frequently enough, and are taken seriously by federal courts often enough, to suggest that the theory is in some
real sense entrenched.
193. Thomas Jefferson, Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress (June 7 to Aug. 1, 1776), in The
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we think now, that is one central component (at least) of the first formulations of what
we recognize as modem constitutional law in the humanist retrievals and remodelings of
feudalism 6 undertaken by Ulrich Zasius and his contemporaries early in the sixteenth
9
century. 1
Laurence Tribe and Frank Michelman, writing in 1977, were obviously aware that
their arguments fell outside the range of ordinary judicial formulas-"doctrine," we have
learned to say. 197 They sought to describe what Professor Tribe would today call "the
invisible Constitution,"' 19 8 suppositions that constitutional provisions or-in this
instance-judicial conclusions simply cannot separate out. 199 We cannot help but
notice, some thirty years later, that Tribe and Michelman wrote in advance of what we
might think of as our own era's appreciation of constitutional texts as distinctive
contributions to the "literature of public documents," 200 richly complex in their own
internal reverberations, 20 1 worded in terms alluding to long chains of provocative claims,
commitments, and cross-references. We have also come, with less resistance than in the
past, to understand judicial opinions as very much a separate genre, evocative of
distinctive preoccupations, a separate politics-William Rehnquist helped us remember
this (so too, of course, William Brennan, Charles Evans Hughes, and John Marshall).
We are, as one result, no longer as surprised by glimpses of the complicated relationship
of constitutional texts and judicial formulations of "constitutional law."
"Brilliance" (so suspicious for Professor Farber) now seems more like a not
unexpected artifact or by-product of this complexity. The Tribe and Michelman reading
of National League of Cities should strike us as richly textual, well-rooted in a
Fourteenth Amendment we no longer read with eyes wide shut--even if we have not yet
fully come to grips with its principal implications. 20 2 Justice Rehnquist's opinion, we
also can see now, was one effort among many in his campaign to blow open (or up) what
he took to be then-conventional contents of Supreme Court opinions, in advance (we
may think) of his own subsequent assertions of new conventions, conceivably
superseded themselves as this century progresses.
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